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Responding to a question concerning whether or not his followers should pay taxes to the
Roman government, the Bible records that Jesus answered, "Render unto Caesar the things that
are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's."3 This statement, quoted in the Bible's
Gospel of Matthew, has been called one of the "most revolutionary and history-making
utterances that ever fell from those lips divine.",4 While the famous words of Jesus make clear
the existence of a distinction between the realms of religion and government, they shed little
light on the type of balance that should be struck between them.5
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof...." 6 Cases arising under the Establishment Clause have presented a wide
variety of issues.7 Tests used by the courts to determine whether a government action or statute
1 McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
2 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
'Matthew 22:21 (NRSV).
4 Robert B. Setzer, Jr., On Being a First Baptist: Freedom First Baptists, a Sermon for Religious Liberty Day (2004),
http://www.bjcpa.org/resources/sermons/0404 rldaysetzer.htm (quoting Walter B. Shurden, Ti-E BAPTIST IDENTITY:
FouR FRAGILE FREEDOMS 52 (Smyth & Helwys Publishing, Inc. 1993)).
http://www.bjcpa.org/resources/sermons/0404 rldaysetzer.htm.
'See Jim Spivey, Separation No Myth: Religious Liberty's Biblical and Theological Bases, 36 Sw. J. THEOLOGY 10
(No. 5 1994), available at http://www.bjcpa.org/resources/pubs/pubspiveyseparation.htm.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking down a state law creating
a school district for the Jewish community); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down graduation
invocation); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down law allowing employees not to
work on Sabbath); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding display of creche outside courthouse);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (invalidating salary supplements paid to private school teachers of secular
subjects); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding statute exempting religious
organizations from real estate property tax); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
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is constitutional have varied just as widely.8 Whatever the relationship between church and state,
it appears that the Framers wisely anticipated the need for a distinction between the two. As one
commentator noted:
Established religion blurs the boundaries between church and state in such a
way that the two institutions intrude upon each other. As the church
manipulates the state as an engine for power, it produces bad government.
Worse still, the state entices the church with promises of power derived from a
political manifesto rather than from Scripture, and the state subtly shifts the
focus of allegiance from God to a humanistic, ideological cause.9
In an American cultural climate in which religious conservatives and secularists have
become increasingly polarized and in which the use of religious language by public figures is
increasing, the Supreme Court recently decided two cases brought under the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution. These cases presented the Court with the opportunity to settle
definitively the question of how to determine whether a government's action constitutes an
establishment of religion and therefore violates the Establishment Clause.
While at first glance, the Court's rulings in Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County,
Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union may appear to be distinct and opposing interpretations of
the Establishment Clause, closer examination reveals a thread of consistency and the possibility
of the emergence of a more defined test for Establishment Clause analysis.
In 1802, Thomas Jefferson read the First Amendment and advocated "a wall of separation
between church and state." 10 But the Supreme Court did not adopt such a bright-line test, and,
prior to Van Orden and Perry, cases brought under the Establishment Clause were largely
decided based on the test set forth by Chief Justice Burger in his majority opinion in Lemon v.
(invalidating statute providing for Bible reading in public schools).
8 See Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (neutrality test); Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (coercion test); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989) (endorsement test); Lemon, 403 U. S. 602 (three-part examination). See generally Lynch, 465 U.S.
668 (stating that the Court "ha[s] repeatedly emphasized [its] unwillingness to be confined to any single test or
criterion in this sensitive area").
9 Spivey, supra note 5.
10 Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association
(Jan, 1, 1802)), available at http://www.usconstitution.net/jeffwall.html.
Kurtzman." Lemon declared unconstitutional the use of government funding to subsidize the
wages of teachers at private, predominantly Catholic schools, even though those teachers did not
teach religious subjects or include religion in their instruction of secular subjects.1 2 Lemon
introduced a three-part examination culled from what Chief Justice Burger called the
"cumulative criteria" developed in the Court's previous Establishment Clause decisions:13 "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion., 14 "[F]inally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion."'"5 Violation of any of these three principles
by a statute or government action, Burger wrote, should result in a determination that the statute
or action is unconstitutional. 6
However, not all Establishment Clause decisions have utilized the Lemon test. Rather,
some cases have called for the use of an "endorsement test," in which the constitutionality of
government action is based upon whether a reasonable observer would perceive governmental
endorsement of religion. 7 As the Lynch Court pointed out, "[f]ocus exclusively on the religious
component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment
Clause." 8 Under the endorsement test, the emphasis is placed upon the religious component in
context.19 So, for example, a creche, standing alone, may be an invalid state action; a creche
displayed during the Christmas season, on the other hand, could be considered historical and
therefore constitutional. ° In endorsement test cases, the Court scrutinizes the legislation or
11 403 U.S. at 612-13.121d.
13 Id. at 612.14 Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
15 Id. at 612-613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
16 Id. at 612.
17 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding display of a creche outside a courthouse because it was
displayed with secular, historical symbols of Christmas).18 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
19 Id
20 Id.
government action "to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so. ',21
Other decisions, including, possibly, the recent Van Orden ruling, have applied a type of
coercion test that would invalidate governmental action under the Establishment Clause if the
action results in coercing support of or participation in religion, or provides a direct benefit to a
religious group to such a degree that it establishes religion.22 Some cases have taken a
"governmental neutrality" approach under which "'a proper respect for both the Free Exercise
and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of neutrality toward religion'
... favoring neither one religion over others nor religious adherents collectively over
nonadherents.,, 23 The proper relationship between government and religion is not one of
hostility, but rather neutrality; a "benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to
exist without sponsorship and without interference., 24 As the Schempp Court explained, "the
State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or
showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe." 25 In other cases, the Court has recognized that separation of church and state cannot
be completely achieved without some contact between the two and has allowed government
accommodation of religion so long as the involvement does not result in "excessive
entanglement" of the government in religion.26
In Stone v. Graham, the Supreme Court ruled that a Kentucky statute requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments in public schoolrooms across the state contravened the
21 Id. at 678 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
22 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down government-
sponsored non-sectarian invocation at public school graduation ceremony).
23 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-793 (1973)).
24 Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
25 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 314 (1952)).
26 William M. Howard, Annotation, First Amendment Challenges to Display of Religious Symbols on Public
Property, 107 A.L.R.5TH 1, 23 (2003) (citing 16A AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 422 (1998) (internal citation
omitted)); see, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 664.
Constitution because it promoted a religious purpose.2' The Stone Court applied the Lemon test
and found that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and
Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that
fact. ',28 However, the Court was quick to point out that the display in question was posted purely
for religious purposes and was not "integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may
constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative
religion, or the like. 29
In Van Orden v. Perry, Texas law school graduate Thomas Van Orden sued the state of
Texas seeking an injunction for the removal of a granite monument placed on the grounds of the
Texas State Capitol in Austin.3" The monument, placed by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1961
as part of a nationwide campaign to reduce juvenile delinquency, was part of a twenty-two acre
park consisting of seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical markers celebrating the
history of Texas.3' Displayed on the monument were selected verses of the Ten
Commandments.32
A plurality of four justices found the placement of the monument constitutional based
upon the context in which the monument was displayed and argued for allowing governments to
post the Ten Commandments virtually anywhere other than public school classrooms. 33 The
four (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) acknowledged the role
of religion in American history and culture and noted the existence of displays throughout
federal government buildings, including the Supreme Court Building, which incorporate the Ten
Commandments in some fashion.3 4 In writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist found
27 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 43 (1980).
28 1d. at41.
29 Id. at 42 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225).
30 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 2858, 2863-64; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987).34 Id. at 2862.
that Establishment Clause cases have two faces: one looking toward the historical role of religion
and religious tradition and another looking toward the principle that government entanglement in
religion affects religious freedom.35 The Chief Justice acknowledged the religious content of the
Ten Commandments but stated that they "have an undeniable historical meaning. '36 Noting the
Court's previous use of the Lemon test, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected its use as a valid test in
this case on the grounds that it was "not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument"
that had been erected by the Eagles on the grounds of Texas' statehouse.37 Distinguishing
between the monument in Van Orden and the displays in Stone, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that
because the monument had sat unchallenged for forty years and because Van Orden had passed it
for nearly six years prior to filing his suit, "[t]he placement of the Ten Commandments
monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds is a far more passive use of those texts than was
the case in Stone,"3 thereby limiting the holding in Stone to the context of public schools.39
Justice Scalia's short concurrence preferred to find nothing unconstitutional when a State
favors religion generally whether through public prayer or non-proselytizing veneration of the
Ten Commandments.4 ° Justice Thomas' concurrence advocated a "retur[n] to the original
meaning of the word 'establishment"' which he believed the Framers understood to mean "actual
legal coercion., 41 Under that original definition, Justice Thomas wrote, the Texas display of the
Ten Commandments would be constitutional.42
Justice Steven Breyer, who concurred in the result, cast the deciding fifth vote to uphold
the constitutionality of the Ten Commandments monument; however, his opinion rejected the
" Id. at 2859; see Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
36 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863.
371d at 2861.
38 Id at 2864.
" See id.
40 Id. at 2864 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727-32 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
41 Id. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
42 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865.
plurality's reasoning and advanced a theory of fact-specific, case-by-case analysis of
Establishment Clause cases. 43 Justice Breyer wrote that there is "no single mechanical formula
that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every case. '44 Rather, in "difficult, borderline
cases" such as Van Orden, there could be no "test-related substitute for the exercise of legal
judgment" which is "faithful to the underlying purposes of the Clauses" and considers the
"context and consequences measured in light of those purposes. 45 Justice Breyer found the
monument to be constitutional because the circumstances surrounding its placement indicated
that Texas intended its secular message to prevail, but he rejected the plurality's position which
would have effectively validated any government use of the Ten Commandments short of
posting them in public schools. 46
In a case decided the same day, McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties
Union, the Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction requiring the removal of framed
copies of the King James Version of the Ten Commandments which had been posted in the
courtrooms of two Kentucky counties.47 Following the initial filing of the lawsuit, the displays
had been modified twice, eventually bearing the title "Foundations of American Law and
Government" and incorporating other historical documents, including the texts of the Magna
Carta, the Star-Spangled Banner, and the Declaration of Independence. 48 Writing for the 5-4
majority, Justice Souter held that the display in question violated the Establishment Clause
because it was placed by the counties for a primarily religious purpose.49 Justice Souter noted
that appellate courts across the country routinely examine purpose in determining constitutional
issues, but that such an examination should be conducted through the eyes of an "objective
41 Id. at 2868-71 (Breyer, J., concurring).
44 Id. at 2868 (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
45 Id.at 2869.
461d. at 2870-71.
4 7 McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 (2005).
48Id. at 2731.
49 Id. at 2745.
observer."5 ° In determining whether a display lacks a "secular legislative purpose,"51 Justice
Souter wrote, a court should examine the plain meaning of the statute's words, the context of
enactment and legislative history and the sequence of events leading to its passage.52 The
majority concluded that, while past actions do not "forever taint" future attempts to make the
display constitutionally valid, inclusion of the Ten Commandments in the display, even after
modification, violated the Establishment Clause because of the context and manner in which it
was originally erected.53 Even though the counties eventually included various documents of
historical interest with the Ten Commandments, the Court found that the resulting display still
failed to pass the neutrality test, largely because the counties failed to show secular legislative
purpose in both the posting of the Commandments and in the timing of the changes made to the
display.54 In contrast to the apparent acceptance by the Van Orden plurality of the validity of a
government's use of the Ten Commandments,55 Justice Souter wrote that "[w]here a text is set
out, the insistence of the religious message is hard to avoid in the absence of a context plausibly
suggesting a message going beyond an excuse to promote a religious point of view."56 In further
contrast with the Van Orden plurality, Justice Souter examined Stone, determining that it found
an inherently religious message in the Ten Commandments which would violate the
Establishment Clause no matter where posted, unless integrated with a secular message of some
type.57 Justice Souter noted the dissent's interest in advancing government support for
monotheism58 and held that "[t]he government may not favor one religion over another, or
religion over irreligion, religious choice being the prerogative of individuals under the Free
5od. at 2734.
51 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
52 MeCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2734 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987)).
53 Id. at 2741.
54 Id. at 2740.
55 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864.
56 McCreary County, 125 S.Ct. at 2738.
57 Id. at 2739.
58Id. at 2743;
Exercise Clause."5 9 In contrast, the granite monument at issue in Van Orden was determined to
be a constitutional display because of its context in a larger setting of historical value and
because it had stood unchallenged for more than forty years after its initial placement by the
Eagles.6 °
In her concurrence in McCreary County, Justice O'Connor found that the display
conveyed a message of endorsement of religion by the Kentucky counties.61 She noted that
while religious diversity was not so widely recognized during the time of the Framers, the First
Amendment's broad language protects even those Americans who do not accept the validity of
the Ten Commandments.6 2 "It is true," she wrote, "that many Americans find the
Commandments in accord with their personal beliefs. But we do not count heads before
enforcing the First Amendment., 63 Justice O'Connor noted the rise of religious violence around
the world and pointedly remarked that "[t]hose who would renegotiate the boundaries between
church and state must therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that
has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?"
64
Until this summer, the Establishment Clause "system" of which Justice O'Connor spoke
consisted of a variety of tests, the most prominent of which was the three-part examination set
forth in Lemon.65 Van Orden's plurality rejected Lemon and advocated a virtual presumption of
constitutionality when considering government purpose; 66 however Justice Breyer's concurrence
supported a fact-specific, case-by-case analysis. 67 Read alongside the majority's reasoning in
McCreary County, in which Justice Breyer joined and which advocated consideration of the
59 Id. at 2742.
61 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864.
61 MeCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2747 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62 See id.
63 Id. (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Barnette, 319 U.S. at
638.64 1d at 2746.
65 See supra notes 9, 11-29 and accompanying text.
66 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2859-64 (2005); see also supra text accompanying notes 33-39.
67 Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. 2868-72 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
context and legislative history of the enactment and examination of the legislative purpose by an
objective observer applying Lemon, it appears that future Establishment Clause cases will be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis with special examination given to the context in which a
government's purported establishment of religion has occurred. 68
The result crafted by the Supreme Court in Van Orden and McCreary County assures the
need for future litigation in this area to clarify whether an examination of context becomes the
test by which future Establishment Clause cases are decided. Two thousand years ago Jesus
instructed his followers to examine context when deciding when to obey God and when to obey
the state. Ironically, the Supreme Court may now be following his advice.
68 See, e.g., Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868-69 (Breyer, J., concurring).
